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IMPLEADIER-A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
WISCONSIN AND THE FEDERAL PRACTICE
One of the procedural devices available to both the plaintiff and de-
fendant in an action in state courts, including Wisconsin, is that of
Third Party Practice or "Impleader." It becomes available to a party to
an action upon a motion to bring into the suit a third party who is liable
for all or a part of the claim asserted against the moving party.
"A defendant, who if he be held liable in an action, will thereby
obtain a right of action against a person not a party may apply
for an order making such a person a party defendant and the
court may so order."'
The provisions of Rule 14 (a) of the Feneral Rules of Procedure
covering Impleader in the federal courts are much more extensive than
Impleader in the state practice, in that the Rule permits the defendant to
ask for bringing in not only of a person liable to him, but also of a per-
son "liable to the plaintiff" * * * for all or a part of the plaintiff's
claim." Under this provision the original defendant, by the third party
complaint, may tender to the plaintiff another defendant, who, it is
alleged, is liable for all of the claim asserted against the original de-
fendant.
Impleader, although a comparatively modern innovation in law and
equity, prevailed for many years in admiralty practice under the Ad-
miralty Rule 56. Under the Conformity Act, Impleader was applied in
Federal Courts in actions at law when it was allowed in state procedure.
Impleader is permitted in four distinct instances: (1) In cases of
vicarious liability ;3 (2) in cases of contribution; (3) in subrogation
cases under the equitable principles; and (4) in indemnity cases as in
the case of liability insurers.4
Commencing with the decision in Ellis v. Chicago and North West-
ern Railroad,5 the Wisconsin courts have efficiently put into operation
this advanced advanced system of procedure in contribution cases. In
that case a judgment was rendered against both a railway company and
a traction company for damages on account of personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of a collision between a train and an interurban car;
the court based its decision upon the reasoning that although both were
negligent, the one in failing to ascertain that the train was coming, and
1 Wis. Stat. (1941) Sec. 260.19(3).2 Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 14(a).
s Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal. (1923) 204 App. Div. 741, 199
N. Y. Supp. 9.
4Tullgren v. Jasper. D. C. Md. 1939, 27 F. Supp. 413.
5 Ellis v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).
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the other in running the train at an unlawful rate of speed, yet it ap-
peared that there was no wilful or conscious wrong upon the part of
either negligent party, and that therefore the company which pays the
judgment might compel contribution from the other. The Wisconsin
Court considered the decision in the English case of Merryweather v.
Nixon,6 which held that the law would not imply contribution between
wrongdoers, but followed the reasoning which distinguishes between
wrongs intentionally committed through inadvertance and negligence.'
In respect to offences in which there is involved any moral delinquency
or turpitude, all parties are deemed equally guilty and courts will not
inquire into their relative guilt. But where the offense is merely malum
prohibitum and is in no respect immoral, it is not against the policy of
the law to inquire into the relative delinquency of the parties and to
administer justice between them although both parties be wrongdoers. 8
Before 1939 when the present statute was enacted, the Wisconsin
courts allowed a defendant, who would show by an affidavit that if he
would be liable in an action he would have a right of action against a
third person not a party to the action for the amount of the recovery
against him, upon due notice to such person and the opposing party, to
make an application to the court for an order making such third person
a party defendant in order that the final rights of all parties might be
completely settled in one action. Then the court in its discretion might
make such an order.10 The present statute enacted in 1935 still continues
this discretionary power. An examination of the statute in Wisconsin
reveals that the defendant in an action may not bring in a third party
who would be solely liable to the plaintiff, but the defendant himself
must be liable in part and seek a partial recovery from the party whom
he seeks to implead.1" However under the present day practice in Wis-
consin, which differs in this respect from that of New York and other
code states, 12 a defendant is not forced to rely upon a joint judgment
before he can seek contribution from a joint-tortfeasor.
In the Federal Courts, by the provision of Rule 14(a) Impleader is
more extensive than in the most liberal code-state practices.'3 The pur-
pose of Impleader is to avoid circuity of action and to dispose of the
entire subject matter in one litigation and to accomplish ultimate justice
with the least number of trials possible. For this reason, under the
Federal Rule 14(a), the defendant may bring in not only a person who
6 Merryveather v. Nixon, 8 T. R. 186.
76 K. C. L. 1055.8 Supra, note 7.
9 Wis. Stat. (1935) c. 541 s. 10.
10 Supra, note 9.
3" Supra, note 1.
12 N. Y. Stat. (1935) 211(a)
13 Supra, note 2.
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may be liable to him for a part of the judgment rendered against him,
but also a person claimed by the defendant to be solely liable to the
plaintiff for the entire amount of the plaintiff's claim. In Crim v. Lum-
bermen's Mutual Casualty Company,'14 the plaintiff sought to hold the
defendant insurance company liable in alternative causes of action:
first, upon an oral promise to pay if she would refrain from prosecuting
her claim against the decendent's personal representative; and second,
on a claim of having been induced to abandon her cause of action by
practice of fraud on the part of the defendant insurance company.15
The defendant made its motion for Impleader, to make the plaintiff's
attorney, a third party, on the ground that it was through his negligence
that the plaintiff lost her right of action against the personal representa-
tive of the deceased, and that such a third party is liable to the plaintiff
for all of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant and the third party
plaintiff. The judgment that was demanded was one against the third
party for all sums that might be adjudged against the defendant and
payable to the plaintiff. The holding of the court sustaining the motion
was based upon the reasoning that since the plaintiff might have joined
the third party defendant originally, in proceeding against both him and
the insurance company in the alternative, the defendant insurance com-
pany might bring in the attorney as a third party defendant. 16
Under the Federal Rule, it was further held that a store sued for
injuries could file a third party complaint against the owner of the
store on the ground that the owner and mortgagee were solely liable for
the injuries.7 And in an action by an occupant of an automobile against
a township and a county for injuries resulting from improper construc-
tion and maintenance of a highway across a railroad track, the occupant
could not object to the addition as third party defendants of the railroad
company and the owner of the automobile, on the ground that Rule
14(a) did not permit joinder of third party defendants if the substan-
tive law of the state does not permit reimbursements, as between tort-
feasors, where the township and county did not ask reimbursement but
merely that any judgment recovered be against the railroad company
and the owner of the automobile and not against the township and
county.'
The plaintiff himself is not compelled under either state of Federal
practice to assert a claim against a third party defendant impleaded by
the original defendant. He has the privilege of amending his complaint,
but not the obligation to do so. If he does not avail himself of the
'4 Crim v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 26 F. Supp. 715. (1939).
:15 Supra, note 14.
26 Supra, note 14.
37 Kravas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. D. C. P. 1939, 28 F. Supp. 66.
18 Satink v. Township of Holland, D. C. N. J. 1939, 28 F. Supp. 67.
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privilege he may assert his claim against the third party defendant in
an independent action. However the procedure followed if the plaintiff
does amend his complaint so as to include the third party defendant as a
co-defendant is precisely the same as if the plaintiff had sued them as
co-defendants originally. If the plairitiff does not amend, the defendant
may file his cross-claim and the sued defendant prosecutes the third
party on the cross-claim exactly as the plaintiff in turn prosecutes him;
the same witnesses and testimony are used in this prosecution because
the purpose of the cross-litigation is to prove the third party's negligence
toward the plaintiff. The two claims are litigated at the same time and
all issues are submitted to the jury.19 Any rights of appeal which exist
between the plaintiff and the original defendant are also available to the
third party defendant, but the plaintiff is not hindered from withdraw-
ing from the action and executing his several judgment as soon as
possible. Under such practice the plaintiff cannot complain that he is
being deprived of his right to sue the party whom he wishes, and again
he is not precluded from subsequently asserting his claim in an inde-
pendent action.20 When an impleaded joint tort-feasor is dismissed from
an action in which no issue of contribution was raised between the de-
fendant and the third party, the judgment is not res adjudicata on the
issue of contribution between the defendant and the third party.2'
The plaintiff in an action also has a right to bring in a third party
when a counter-claim is asserted against him by the defendant, this
practice being allowed under any circumstances when the defendant
would be similarly entitled to do So. 2 2
The device of Impleader arises only from a common liability and
therefore the Wisconsin court, in Zutter v. O'Connell, refused the de-
fendant's motion where a third party to be impleaded was the father of
the minor plaintiff who actually concurred in the negligent act for which
the defendant truck driver was being sued.23 However, since a wife may
bring a suit against her husband in Wisconsin, in Wait v. Pierce, the de-
fendant could have contribution from the plaintiff's husband conditioned
upon the payment of more than one half of the judgment.24
The Wisconsin, as well as the Federal practice of Impleader is a
logical development of the idea of disposing of all of the subject matter
incident to a cause of action based upon the same facts in a single litiga-
tion with economy of litigation by avoiding two actions which should be
tried together. RAzY G. KLETECKA
'9 Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202. 210 N. W. 822.
20 Scharine v. Huebsch, 203 Wis. 261, 234 N. W. 358 (1931).
21 Bakula v. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168 N. W. 378 (1918).2 2 Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Johnson, Drake & Piper. D. C. N. Y. 1939. 25 F.
Supp. 1021.
23 Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N. W. 74 (1930).
24 Supra, note 22.
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